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Summary
The paper develops a two-stage duopoly model to investigate the effects of eliminating
subsidies to state trading enterprises (STEs) as discussed in the WTO Doha Develop-
ment Agenda negotiations on agriculture. Unlike the STE, the private firm may choose
to integrate vertically in order to avoid transaction costs arising from dealing with
downstream operators. The theoretical model shows that eliminating subsidies to the
STE may induce a change in market structure and not necessarily lead to increased
competition. In fact, if transaction costs are large enough relative to fixed costs,
then the result may be a monopoly by the private firm.
Keywords: state trading enterprises, multinational firm, WTO, international market
structure
JEL classification: F12, F51, Q17
1. Introduction
The July 2004 Framework Agreement and the December 2005 Hong Kong
Ministerial Declaration within the WTO Doha Development Agenda (DDA)
round make it clear that, if an agreement is reached, it will contain specific dis-
ciplines for agricultural exporting state trading enterprises (STEs). According
to the Hong Kong Declaration, direct disciplines will be introduced on export
subsidies, government financing and the underwriting of losses with the com-
mitment to eliminate these three forms of subsidies to STEs by 2013. In
addition, the use of monopoly power will also be disciplined in the future.
Since the December 2005 Hong Kong Ministerial, negotiations on this issue
have not made appreciable progress.
This tentative agreement is the outcome of the long-standing political
debate on the trade-distorting practices of agricultural STEs. Although STE
operations are already restricted by the GATT, further regulation has been
proposed in the DDA negotiations on agriculture. The most notable proposals
regarding exporting STEs are those by the US and the EU (WTO, 2000a, b).
The US has demanded the elimination of exclusive rights for STEs and of the
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use of government funds or guarantees to support the STEs. The EU, while
asking for the abolition of unfair trade practices in exports, has insisted that
the elimination of direct export subsidies is conditional on implicit export sub-
sidies (STEs, certain forms of food aid and export credit) being disciplined in
the final agreement. Argentina, Brazil and other Latin American countries in
their WTO submissions have also expressed concerns about the potential
trade-distorting effects of exporting STEs (WTO, 2001a).1
On the other hand, among countries where exporting STEs operate,
Australia has stated that ‘. . . the extent to which an STE may, or may not,
distort trade depends on the particular activities and measures undertaken
by the STE concerned’ (WTO, 2001b: 4); therefore, any additional disciplines
should be introduced on a case-by-case basis.
The basic argument of countries demanding further disciplines is that the
agricultural STEs are potentially trade distorting because they benefit from
government privileges that are not available to private firms.2 The suspicion
is that their special status allows STEs to circumvent WTO commitments:
their single-desk status (i.e. their exclusive right to buy domestic production
and to export) means that they may exert market power, use price discrimi-
nation and practice price pooling not ‘in accordance with commercial con-
siderations’, as stated by GATT Article XVII, but rather with the aim of
subsidising domestic agricultural production and exports. Moreover, govern-
ments often provide STEs with financial assistance not available to private
exporters; if the DDA round ends in success, these forms of support will be
eliminated by 2013.
Various effects of exporting STEs have been examined, such as the trade-
distorting effects of single-desk STEs (e.g. Alston and Gray, 2000; Fulton
et al., 2001; McCorriston and MacLaren, 2005, 2007), and the trade effects
of producer payment schemes used by STEs (e.g. Carter et al., 1998; Hamilton
and Stiegert, 2000, 2002; Dong et al., 2006).
The aim of this paper is to analyse the impact of eliminating government
subsidies to exporting STEs, as tentatively agreed in the WTO DDA nego-
tiations, and to examine the possible impact of this policy change on market
structure.3 One of the open issues in the debate over STEs is whether
further disciplines for agricultural exporting STEs would improve competition
and ensure progress towards free trade in markets dominated by oligopolistic
private firms. Although data on market shares of private trading companies
and evidence on their market power are rather limited, there is consensus on
the significance of their role in a number of international markets where
exporting STEs operate. In this respect, the most interesting case is probably
1 The STE issue has also been at the heart of a WTO dispute, with the US complaining about the
compliance of the operations by the Canadian Wheat Board with WTO rules.
2 Several contributions have examined the agricultural STE issue within the WTO (e.g. Dixit and
Josling, 1997; OECD, 2001; McCorriston and MacLaren, 2002; Abbott and Young, 2004; Young,
2005).
3 Other important issues, like the trade effects of STE monopoly power (and the likely impact of its
abolition) and those of the producer payment schemes used by STEs, will not be addressed here.
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the grain trade, where a small number of multinational exporting firms account
for a large share of the international market and there are few exits and hardly
any new entries (Davies, 1986; Wilson and Dahl, 1999; Hayenga and Wisner,
2000).4 The concern is that eliminating STE privileges may reduce their
ability to compete in oligopolistic markets and may strengthen the market
power of large private trading firms (Fulton et al., 2001; Young, 2005).
What the market structure would look like as a result of this, and the impact
on trade and welfare, is generally unclear.
A two-stage duopoly model is developed, with market structure being
endogenously determined in the first stage of the game. Two key differences
between the private firm and the STE are modelled. As is the case in other
papers, the distinctive feature of the STE with respect to the private firm is
its objective function (e.g. Thursby, 1988; Alston and Gray, 2000; McCorriston
and MacLaren, 2005). Although the official objective of exporting STEs is, by
and large, the maximisation of the surplus of agricultural producers, what the
real objectives pursued by STEs are is quite a controversial issue and some
papers have modelled other objective functions (e.g. Carter et al., 1998;
Hamilton and Stiegert, 2002; Dong et al., 2006). This paper assumes that
the STE, contrary to the private firm which maximises profit, maximises the
welfare of agricultural producers. An explanation of how this assumption
may influence the results is provided throughout.
Unlike the existing literature, we introduce a second distinction between the
two firms, that is, their organisational structure. The private firm may choose
between two different exporting modes: either to sell the product to other
agents performing downstream functions (indirect exports) or to integrate ver-
tically in the shipping, storage and processing industries in the foreign country
(direct exports). The latter, although requiring initial fixed costs generating
economies of scale, is chosen by the private firm in order to avoid transaction
costs arising from having to negotiate with downstream operators. The motiv-
ation for direct exports is, thus, based on the transaction costs approach to ver-
tical integration developed in the literature on multinational firms (Caves,
1996; Markusen, 2002) and, more recently, in international trade theory
(Spencer, 2005). Despite the limited literature on multinational trading firms
operating in agricultural markets, there is a consensus on the existence of
vertical integration and on the significance of scale economies.5
In the model developed in this paper, the STE can only operate as a ‘pure mid-
dleman’; that is, it does not own trading facilities and, therefore, sells the product
to other firms that perform most of the international marketing functions. As a
result, it does not incur fixed costs generating tangible economies of scale.
4 Hayenga and Wisner (2000) report that in the late 1990s two firms, Cargill and Continental (which
was acquired in 1998 by Cargill), accounted for 35 per cent of US grain and oilseed exports and the
top four firms accounted for 47 per cent of USwheat exports; Cargill alone accounted for about the
25 per cent of Argentine wheat exports.
5 Case studies have highlighted the extensive upstream and downstream integration processes of
multinational trading firms in several agricultural markets (e.g. Chalmin, 1986; Read, 1986; Wilson
and Dahl, 1999; Hayenga and Wisner, 2000).
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This means that, if transaction costs in international trade are high, the private
firm has a competitive advantage over the STE, since it can decide to skip trans-
action costs and exploit economies of scale. This assumption is based on the
observation that agricultural exporting STEs traditionally do not own trading
or processing assets abroad (Carter and Wilson, 1997).6 Among the most import-
ant agricultural STEs, the Canadian Wheat Board is an example of an STE that
makes use of accredited agents to reach final consumers.
The model developed in this paper builds on the game theoretical models of
international trade that include multinational firms (e.g. Horstmann and
Markusen, 1992; Motta, 1992; Markusen, 2002), even though the setting is
substantially different, since it considers specific features of international
agricultural trade. In the aforementioned models, private firms invest in the
foreign countries to jump the tariffs, whereas in this paper the motive for
international integration is the presence of transaction costs. Furthermore,
all papers mentioned above assume constant domestic costs and symmetry
between firms, whereas this paper introduces increasing marginal costs and
asymmetry in firm behaviour and objective functions.
The theoretical model is used to study how the elimination of STE subsidies
affects market structure. The trade and welfare effects of possible market
structure changes are examined by means of numerical examples. The
results show that the elimination of subsidies to the STE may have different
impacts on market structure, trade and welfare, depending on the initial
values of transaction and fixed costs and of the subsidy.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3
determines the feasible equilibria and the impact of the elimination of the
subsidies to the STE on market structure. Section 4 discusses the conse-
quence on trade and welfare through a numerical example. Section 5 dis-
cusses the implications of the results obtained and offers some concluding
remarks.
2. The model
The model considers two exporting countries (i and j) and one importing
country (z) of a homogeneous agricultural product. Exports from country i
are managed by a private firm, while an STE has the exclusive right to pur-
chase and export from country j. Both firms sell on their own domestic
market and export to country z. Production in country z is assumed to be
zero. This setting is intended to represent competition between two exporting
countries on the same export market, with exports carried out by a large
private firm in one country and by an STE in the other.
Let pi, pj and pz be the inverse demand curves. Linear functional forms and
identical demand in the two exporting countries are assumed: pi ¼ a2 b XMi,
6 Ongoing reforms are in some cases removing this restriction, at least in part. For example, the
New Zealand Dairy Board, which accounts for about 30 per cent of world dairy exports, is now
a leading multinational dairy company, co-operatively owned by New Zealand dairy farmers.
432 Margherita Scoppola
pj ¼ a2 bXSj and pz ¼ l2 d (XMzþ XSz) with XM and XS being exports/
sales of the private firm and of the STE, respectively.
The private firm may export to z either indirectly or directly. In the first
case, the firm operates as a ‘pure middleman’ and sells the product to
other agents. With this option, the firm incurs transaction costs, tz, per unit
exported, which are assumed to be constant. In the second case, the firm inte-
grates downstream to eliminate transaction costs, but this option implies
fixed costs, denoted by G, including both the cost of acquiring facilities
for storage, handling, transportation or processing, and also the information
and legal costs necessary to open a subsidiary in a foreign country. The
private firm, thus, chooses direct (indirect) exports if transaction costs
(fixed costs) are high relative to fixed costs (transaction costs). This hypo-
thesis builds on the literature on the multinational firm, which emphasises
that vertical integration is frequently chosen by firms to internalise costly
arm’s-length transactions (e.g. Caves, 1996; Markusen, 2002). Despite the
lack of empirical evidence, there are good arguments to support the hypoth-
esis that transaction costs play a relevant role in the firm’s degree of forward
integration also in agricultural markets. As for grain, for example, Caves
(1977) argues that trading in agricultural products is a time-dependent
activity, as the optimal utilisation of trading facilities depends on their
available capacity at particular points in time. Opportunism in bargaining
processes may lead to high transaction costs and make it advantageous to
coordinate such activities within an administrative apparatus rather than at
arm’s length. For other agricultural commodities, case studies show that
one of the reasons for vertical integration by international trading firms is
the need to ensure access to supplies without incurring costly transactions
with local producers (Chalmin, 1986; Read, 1986).
On the other hand, the STE is assumed to export only indirectly. As its
mandate is to operate as a ‘pure middleman’, it cannot purchase trading or
processing assets. As already mentioned, this feature is common to exporting
agricultural STEs.
In this model, both firms purchase, sell domestically and export domestic
agricultural products only. The inverse supply functions for the agricultural
product faced by the STE and the private firm are assumed to be linear and
are given, respectively, by cs ¼ uþ r (XSjþ XSz) and cm ¼ wþ k(XMiþ XMz).
The firms also bear firm-specific set-up costs (Cm and Cs), which include the
cost of acquiring intangible assets (e.g. information) that are essential for the
trading industry (Caves, 1977). Firm-specific fixed costs are assumed to be
high relative to demand, and thus markets can support at most two firms.
Furthermore, the said costs are considered to be faced by firms on the domestic
market. Markets are assumed to be segmented.7
7 Price discrimination by STEs is a much debated issue. Some studies on the international wheat
trade conclude that there is a degree of price discrimination by the Canadian Wheat Board
(e.g. Brooks and Schmitz, 1999; Lavoie, 2005).
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Two kinds of subsidies to the STEs are considered: a per unit subsidy s,
which is assumed to be paid on both domestic sales and exports, and a fixed
subsidy U. The former is aimed at capturing certain government privileges
that enable STEs to reduce their variable costs. For example, government
guarantees for commercial loans allow STEs to have access to financial
resources at a lower interest rate than would otherwise be the case (Carter
and Wilson, 1997; Dixit and Josling, 1997). On the other hand, the fixed
subsidy U captures other privileges that have the effect of reducing the
fixed costs of the STE. For example, the expectation of the government’s
underwriting of losses may encourage the STE to sustain higher administrative
costs (Furtan, 2005); it has also been argued that the government guarantee of
STE borrowing and export credit sales creates a ‘financial cushion’ that the
STE may use to recover general expenses (Goodloe, 2004).
The firms play a two-stage game. In the first stage, firms choose the entry
strategy; moves in the first stage of the game are assumed to be simultaneous.
The possible actions considered in the first stage do not include those where
the firm chooses to export to z without selling on the domestic market. There-
fore, for the private firm there are four potential strategies, whereas the STE
has three. Table 1 shows the payoff matrix of the game. The action set of
the firms is given by the combinations of their choices on the domestic and
foreign markets. More specifically, the private firm in the domestic market
chooses either to enter (in Table 1, this is denoted by i) or not to enter
(denoted by 0), whereas in the foreign market it chooses between the no-
entry option (which is denoted by 0), indirect exports (denoted by z) and
direct exports (denoted by zd); the action set of the STE is equal to that of
the private firm, but does not include the option of direct exports.
In the second stage, the firms play a Cournot game. The game is solved
backwards, by first considering the second stage decision. As elsewhere
(e.g. Thursby, 1988; Alston and Gray, 2000; McCorriston and MacLaren,
2005), the STE and the private firm are assumed to behave differently. The
private firm is assumed to exercise monopsony power with respect to agricul-
tural producers and to maximise its profits. The STE is assumed to maximise
the welfare of domestic agricultural producers.
Table 1. The pay-off matrix
STE
[0, 0]
0
[ j, 0]
1
[ j, z]
2
Private firm [0, 0] 0 0 0, S01 0, S02
[i, 0] 1 M10, 0 M11, S11 M12, S12
[i, z] 2 M20, 0 M21, S21 M22, S22
[i, zd] 3 M
30, 0 M31, S31 M32, S32
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Let M denote the profit of the private firm when it chooses to export
indirectly to z:
M ¼ piXMi þ pzXMz  cmðXMi þ XMzÞ  tzXMz  Cm: ð1Þ
If the firm maximises its objective function assuming the rival’s exports
constant (Cournot competition), first-order conditions are given by:8
dM
dXMi
¼ 2bXMi þ a w 2kðXMi þ XMzÞ ¼ 0; ð2Þ
dM
dXMz
¼ 2dXMz þ l dXSz  w 2kðXMi þ XMzÞ  tz ¼ 0; ð3Þ
from which we obtain
XMi ¼ a w 2kXMz
2ðbþ kÞ ð4Þ
and
XMz ¼ l dXSz  w 2kXMi  tz
2ðdþ kÞ : ð5Þ
The STE’s objective function is
S ¼ pjXSj þ pzXSz þ sðXSj þ XSzÞ þ U 
ðXSjþXSz
0
csdðXSj þ XSzÞ  tzXSz  Cs:
ð6Þ
First-order conditions are
dS
dXSj
¼ a 2bXSj þ s u rXSj  rXSz ¼ 0 and ð7Þ
dS
dX Sz
¼ l 2dXSz  dXMz þ s u rXSj  rXSz  tz ¼ 0; ð8Þ
which yield
XSj ¼ a uþ s rXSz
2bþ r ; ð9Þ
8 Scoppola (2007) addresses the issue of how the assumed mode of competition and product
homogeneity affect the results in this kind of model, albeit within a rather different setting; unlike
this paper, domestic costs are constant, both firms maximise profits and there are two-way trade
flows between the exporting countries.
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and
XSz ¼ l dXMz þ s u rXSj  tz
2dþ r : ð10Þ
Using equations (4) and (9), equations (5) and (10) can be solved for XMz
and XSz to obtain the duopoly equilibrium exports when the private firm
exports indirectly. The quantities exported to z under the outcome f2, 2g of
Table 1 are
XM22z ¼
A½Hðl w tzÞ  E  dH½Dðl u tz þ sÞ  F  r s
Q
ð11Þ
and
XS22z ¼
B½Dðl u tz þ sÞ  F  r s  dD½Hðl w tzÞ  E
Q
; ð12Þ
where H ¼ bþ k, D ¼ 2bþ r, E ¼ k(a2 w), F ¼ r(a2 u),
A ¼ D(2dþ r)2 r2, B ¼ 2H(dþ k)2 2k2 and Q ¼ AB2 d2HD.
The payoffs to the firms in equilibrium are then derived by substituting the
supply and demand functions and the domestic equilibrium quantities into the
objective functions (1) and (6), which yields
M22 ¼ ða wÞ
2
4H
þ l w tz  E
H
 dXS22z
 
XM22z
 dþ k k
2
H
 
ðXM22z Þ2  Cm ð13Þ
and
S22 ¼ ðaþ s uÞ
2
2D
þ lþ s u tz  dXM22z 
F þ r s
D
 
XS22z
 1
2
2dþ r r
2
D
 
XS32z
2 þ U  Cs: ð14Þ
If the private firm opts for directs exports, then its profits are given by
M ¼ piXMi þ pzXMz  ciðXMi þ XMzÞ  G Cm; ð15Þ
and maximisation leads to the following duopoly equilibrium exports under
the outcome f3, 2g of Table 1:
XM32z ¼
A½Hðl wÞ  E  dH½Dðl u tz þ sÞ  F  r s
Q
ð16Þ
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and
XS32z ¼
B½Dðl u tz þ sÞ  F  r s  dD½Hðl wÞ  E
Q
: ð17Þ
The payoffs to the firms are then given by
M32 ¼ ða wÞ
2
4H
þ l w E
H
 dXS32z
 
XM32z
 dþ k k
2
H
 
ðXM32z Þ2  Cm  G ð18Þ
and
S32 ¼ ðaþ s uÞ
2
2D
þ lþ s u tz  dXM32z 
F þ r s
D
 
XS32z
 1
2
2dþ r r
2
D
 
ðXS32z Þ2 þ U  Cs: ð19Þ
The equilibrium exports and the associated payoff in the second stage of the
game for all outcomes are reported in Tables A1 and A2 of the Appendix.
As already mentioned, a number of papers have assumed that the STEs do
not maximise producer welfare but, rather, that they have other objective func-
tions such as the welfare of the bureaucracy (Carter et al., 1998) or STE profits
(Hamilton and Stiegert, 2002; Dong et al., 2006). McCorriston and MacLaren
(2007) showed how different objective functions imply different market equi-
libria. In this model, a different objective function affects not only the equili-
brium exports and payoff, but also the market structure, as the payoff to the
STE influences its choice in the first stage of the game. A profit-maximising
STE always exports less than a welfare-maximising STE: first-order conditions
would be similar to those of the private firm exporting indirectly [equations (2)
and (3)]. Also the payoff would be similar and, thus, lower than in the case of
producer welfare maximisation. The outcomes of the game would differ from
those obtained when one assumes an STE maximising producer welfare.
3. The elimination of STE subsidies: impact
on market structure
Outcomes of this two-stage game may be a Nash equilibrium for certain com-
binations of the values of parameters. We are primarily interested in analysing
how the Nash equilibrium may be affected by a change in the value of govern-
ment subsidies to the STE, s and U, and in the value of tz and G, that is, trans-
action and fixed costs, which in this model crucially determine the action
chosen by the private firm. For this purpose, it is first necessary to derive
the constraints that must be satisfied for each of these outcomes to be a
Nash equilibrium. The analysis is here limited to some of the potential
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solutions of the game, and does not consider market structures in which at least
one firm operates domestically only. Although these outcomes are, in theory,
the possible solutions of the game, they are in fact less relevant in the context
of the debate on the trade-distorting effects of subsidies to STEs, and hence,
for the specific purpose of this paper.
Consider outcome f2, 2g of the game (Table 1). This is a Nash equilibrium if
each firm chooses the best response to the action chosen by the rival, that is,
the action that maximises its payoff given the action of the rival. This requires
(i) M22 . 0, (ii) M22. M32 and (iii) S22.0 with XMz
22, XMi
22, XSz
22, XSj
22. 0.
By substituting the equilibrium quantities into equation (13) with equations
(11) and (12), constraint (i) may be written as
M22 ¼ VþCt2z þ Dtz þPsþFs2 þ Gstz  Cm . 0; ð20Þ
where V, C, D, P, F and G depend upon demand and supply function para-
meters. Using equations (13) and (18), constraint (ii) may be written as
C0t2z þ D0tz þ G0stz . G; ð21Þ
while using equation (14), constraint (iii) may be written as
S22 ¼ zþ 1t2z þ4tz þ ysþ ts2 þ mstz þ U  Cs . 0; ð22Þ
where again z, 1, 4, y , t and m are functions of demand and supply function
parameters only.
The same procedure has been used to derive a complete set of constraints for
all other outcomes.9
Each set of constraints defines a region in the parameter space where the
corresponding market structure is a Nash equilibrium. Before analysing how
the subsidies to the STE influence the outcome of the game, consider first
how the Nash equilibrium is affected by different values of costs to export
to market z. If tz is large relative to G, then the optimal choice of the
private firm, whatever the choice of the STE, is to export directly to market
z. The greater tz, the more the STE is at a disadvantage. If transaction costs
become very high, payoff to the STE becomes negative and its optimal
choice is the no-entry option. On the other hand, if G is high enough, the
private firm opts for indirect exports and the STE enters because its payoff
becomes positive. If both tz and G are very high, then duopoly profits may
become negative.
Figure 1 illustrates the possible outcomes of the game in ftz, Gg space, when
the STE does not receive any subsidy from its government and under the
9 The complete set of constraints to be satisfied for each outcome of the game to be a Nash equili-
brium is not reported due to the space constraint. However, they are available from the author
upon request.
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assumption of cost symmetry between firms.10 If the firms face the same costs
and do not receive any subsidy, then differences between them depend upon
two factors: differences in their organisational structure and/or their different
pricing behaviour as a result of the differences in their objective functions.
When both G and tz are zero, regimes f2, 2g and f3, 2g are equivalent. In this
case, the key difference between the two firms is the one in their objective
function: the private firm exercises monopsony power with respect to domestic
producers and its marginal cost is lower than the competitive price, whereas
the STE marginal cost is the competitive supply price. This equilibrium cor-
responds to that obtained in contributions assuming exogenous market struc-
ture and zero fixed costs (e.g. Thursby, 1988; McCorriston and MacLaren,
2005).
If transaction costs are positive, however, market structure may change.
Figure 1 shows that there are three critical values of tz above which a
Figure 1. Market regimes as a function of transaction and fixed costs (s ¼ U ¼ 0). Market
structures are denoted by the corresponding payoff matrix outcome. More specifically,
f2, 2g denotes a duopoly, with the private firm exporting indirectly; f3, 2g a duopoly
with the private firm exporting directly; f0, 2g a monopoly of the STE and f3, 0g a monopoly
of the private firm when it exports directly; in f0, 0g both firms do not enter.
10 Firms’ costs symmetry is here ensured by assuming identical supply function parameters and
equal domestic fixed costs.
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regime shift occurs.11 The lower critical value of tz (in Figure 1, tz ¼ 11) is
defined by the constraints of regimes f3, 2g and f3, 0g. Assume first that the
fixed costs are zero. When transaction costs are below that lower critical
value, regime f3, 2g prevails; in this regime, firms also differ because of their
degree of integration and this implies that, with respect to the market structure
f2, 2g, the private firm’s exports and payoff are higher (XMz32. XMz22 and
M32. M22), whereas those of the STE are lower (XSz
32, XSz
22 and
S32, S22). This is because the former skips transaction costs and increases
its exports at the expense of the latter. When transaction costs are above the
lower critical value, the STE chooses the no-entry option and a monopoly of
the private firm, i.e. regime f3, 0g, is the outcome of the game.
Consider now the effect of an increase in fixed costs. If transaction costs are
below the lower critical value, an increase in fixed costs results in a change in
the private firm’s export strategy from direct exports (region f3, 2g) to indirect
exports (region f2, 2g). This regime shift implies an increase in the STE’s
market share at the expense of the private firm. But when transaction costs
are between the lower and the higher critical value, then the initial regime
is f3, 0g. An increase in fixed costs, and the resulting change in the entry strat-
egy of the private firm, makes the STE payoff positive. As a result, when trans-
action costs are smaller than the intermediate critical value, the regime shifts
from a monopoly, i.e. f3, 0g, towards a duopoly, that is, f2, 2g (in Figure 1, this
occurs for 11, tz, 17). However, if transaction costs are higher than the
intermediate critical level, then an increase in G makes direct exports infeas-
ible, while duopoly profits become negative because of the high transaction
costs. In this case, the feasible equilibrium is a monopoly of the STE f0, 2g
(in Figure 1, this occurs for 17 , tz , 28). The intuition behind this result is
that when fixed costs are high, the private firm cannot exploit its structural
advantage; if transaction costs are also high and duopoly profits are negative,
the payoff to the private firm becomes negative, while that of the STE can still
be positive. This is due to the different behaviour of the two firms. Although
the payoff to the private firm is the result of monopoly and monopsony profits,
the STE payoff includes monopoly profits. It is possible that the STE payoff is
positive, whereas it is negative for the private firm. Thus, when both trans-
action and fixed costs are high, the particular objective function of the STE
may provide it with a strategic advantage with respect to the private firm.
When transaction costs become greater than the higher critical value (in
Figure 1, tz .28), and fixed costs are high enough, then both firms face nega-
tive payoffs and opt for the no-entry option.
The feasible equilibria illustrated in Figure 1 would be somewhat different
if the STE were assumed to maximise the profit instead of its producers’
welfare. First, assuming cost symmetry between firms and a profit-maximising
STE, market regime f0, 2g would never be a feasible equilibrium, as in this
11 The critical values of tz illustrated in Figure 1 are driven by the binding constraints to be satisfied
for each outcome to be a Nash equilibrium. The overlapping of regime f3, 0g with regimes f2, 2g
and f0, 2g denotes a multiple Nash equilibria area.
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case the payoff to the STE would never be greater than that to the private firm.
The second difference is in the critical values of transaction costs above which
the market regime of the private firm shifts to a monopoly; this would be lower
than in Figure 1, because with the profit maximising STE the payoff becomes
negative for lower values of transaction costs.
Figure 2 illustrates the Nash equilibrium as a function of tz and the subsidy
s, assuming again that U ¼ 0.12 As already illustrated in Figure 1, when the
subsidy is zero, and transaction costs are smaller than the lower critical
level (tz ,11), there is a duopoly (regime f2, 2g). A relatively small subsidy
does not change market structure, even though it changes market shares to
the advantage of the STE. If tz. 11, then the private firm opts for direct
exports and this implies a monopoly of the multinational firm (regime
f3, 0g). In this case, an increase in subsidy s allows the STE to enter the
market despite its structural disadvantage. In Figure 2, even with high trans-
action costs, a per unit subsidy equal to 5 is high enough to make the STE
payoff positive. Clearly, the higher the transaction costs, and thus the
Figure 2. Market regimes as a function of transaction costs and the subsidy s (U ¼ 0).
Market structures are denoted by the corresponding payoff matrix outcome. More specifi-
cally, f2, 2g denotes a duopoly, with the private firm exporting indirectly; f3, 2g a duopoly
with the private firm exporting directly; f0, 2g a monopoly of the STE and f3, 0g a monopoly
of the private firm when it exports directly.
12 The overlapping of regime f2, 2g with regime f3, 2g denotes a multiple Nash equilibria area.
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disadvantage of the STE, the greater the subsidy needed to make the STE
payoff positive. Figure 2, therefore, shows that a subsidy to the STE may
re-establish a duopoly and ‘compensate’ the STE for the high transaction
costs it faces with respect to its rival.
If subsidy s is high, an STE monopoly may be the outcome (regime f0, 2g).
The critical value of s above which regime f0, 2g prevails depends on trans-
action costs. More specifically, if tz is low enough (tz, 15), then the higher
the transaction costs, the lower the critical value of the subsidy.
Conversely, if tz. 15, the higher the transaction costs, the higher the
subsidy needed to shift the regime to a monopoly of the STE. This is
because when transaction costs are high and the private firm enters through
direct exports, an increase in transaction costs reduces the payoff only to the
STE. Consequently, the level of subsidy necessary to shift to an STE mono-
poly increases with transaction costs. On the contrary, when the private firm
also faces transaction costs, then the critical value of the subsidy decreases
with transaction costs.
What is the impact, then, of eliminating the subsidy to the STE? Clearly, it
depends on the initial level of the subsidy and on the value of transaction costs.
If transaction costs are below the lower critical value (in Figure 2, tz , 11)
and the subsidy is such that the initial regime falls in region f2, 2g, then market
structure does not change. Even after the elimination of the subsidy, both firms
continue to export to the third market, even though the private firm’s market
share increases at the expense of that of the STE. Conversely, if the value of s
is such that the initial regime is f0, 2g, then eliminating the subsidy may allow
the private firm to enter the market and, thus, a duopoly prevails. Finally, if
transaction costs are larger than the lower critical value (tz . 11), then the
elimination of the subsidy, whatever the initial regime and the value of the
subsidy, will result in the exit of the STE (f3, 0g).
These findings differ only slightly if one assumes the STE maximises
profits. The feasible equilibria would be the same, even though the critical
values of subsidies above which market structure changes would be different.
More specifically, with a profit-maximising STE, a monopoly of the private
firm exporting directly would prevail even with relatively high values of the
subsidy to the STE. Regimes f0, 2g and f3, 2g would be feasible equilibria
only for higher values of s to the STE. Therefore, the direction of the
impact of eliminating the STE subsidy would be the same as that depicted
above, even though the ‘point’ at which market structure changes would be
different.
The impact on market structure of subsidies that enable the STE to reduce
fixed costs is rather different. Figure 3 shows the Nash equilibrium regimes in
the ftz, Ug space, under the assumption that s ¼ 0.
It is worth noting that, if transaction costs are not too high (in Figure 3,
tz, 11), unlike s, a fixed subsidy does not affect market structure: even
high values of U do not shift market structure away from regime f2, 2g.
This is because the entry decision of the private firm is affected by the
STE’s variable costs, but not by its fixed costs. Therefore, for low values of
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tz, the private firm opts for indirect exports in any case, and U, although
increasing the STE’s payoff, does not have any effect: market structure,
exports and market shares do not change.13
However, if transaction costs are high and the private firm opts for
direct exports, then the level of U may affect the STE’s decision regarding
entry: high values of U allow the STE to enter the market and to compete
with the private firm, while with low values of U a multinational mono-
poly prevails.
Therefore, the impact of eliminating the subsidy that reduces the STE’s
fixed costs may be negligible if transaction costs are low and the private
firm exports indirectly. However, if transaction costs are high relative to
fixed costs and the multinational already exports directly, then eliminating
the subsidy may shift the regime from a duopoly to a monopoly.14
Overall, the findings of the model suggest that the effects of eliminating
STE subsidies may or may not change the market structure depending on
the initial regime, which is a function of the values of tz, G, s and U. If
before the policy change there is a duopoly, but the private firm has a
Figure 3. Market regimes as a function of transaction costs and the subsidy U (s ¼ 0).
Market structures are denoted by the corresponding payoff matrix outcome. More
specifically, f2, 2g denotes a duopoly, with the private firm exporting indirectly;
f3, 2g a duopoly with the private firm exporting directly and f3, 0g a monopoly of
the private firm when it exports directly.
13 In this model, it is assumed that the agricultural producers of country j produce the equilibrium
quantities, and that the redistribution of possible STE profits to them does not affect their pro-
duction decision.
14 It is worth noting that, also in this case, the feasible equilibria would not change under the
assumption that the STE maximises profit, even though the critical values of the fixed subsidy
above which regime f3, 2g is a feasible equilibrium would be much higher than in Figure 3.
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strong competitive advantage because of high transaction costs relative to
fixed costs, then eliminating subsidy s may cause a change in market structure,
with a shift to a monopoly of the private firm. Conversely, if transaction costs
are low enough, eliminating s may or may not induce a change in market struc-
ture, depending on the initial value of s in relation to tz: the higher s with
respect to tz, the lower the possibility of a regime shift.
One implication of these findings is that, when assessing the impact of elim-
inating STE subsidies, one should first consider the key features characterising
each export market—in particular, whether or not the private traders are ver-
tically integrated in that specific export market, and whether or not the subsidy
granted to the STE is high enough to give the STE a substantial strategic
advantage. When looking at the competition between private traders and
STEs in a variety of markets, several situations may arise. For example, one
key difference is between export markets where an importing STE operates
and countries where imports are managed by private traders. In the former
countries, as importing STEs have often the exclusive right to import,
private exporters cannot be vertically integrated and, therefore, do not
exploit economies of scale and their potential for a more efficient marketing
structure, whereas the exporting STE exploits the advantages of its peculiar
mandate and nature, even strengthened by the fact that importing STEs
prefer to deal with exporting STEs, rather than with private traders.15 In this
case, subsidy elimination may keep the STE’s payoff positive. The impact
would be very different in countries where private exporters are able to inte-
grate vertically. In that case, subsidy elimination could threaten the STE’s
ability to compete with the private firm, as is the case when the subsidies coun-
terbalance the STE’s structural disadvantage.16
The results obtained also show that eliminating a per unit subsidy (s) may
have quite a different impact from the removal of a fixed subsidy (U ). The
main difference is that, while the value of s influences the decisions of both
firms, subsidies affecting the fixed costs of the STE determine the entry
choice of the STE only. This means that removing these subsidies may
affect market structure as long as it causes the STE payoff to become negative;
that is, only if before the policy change the STE’s disadvantage with respect to
the private firm is so large that without subsidies the STE cannot enter the
market. In this model, this is likely to happen when transaction costs are
high with respect to fixed costs.
A further implication is that the trade and welfare effects of a policy shock
are different from those predicted by models that consider market structure as
15 This evidence has been brought to my attention by one of the referees.
16 As for US–Canada competition in the grain trade, there are importing countries (like Algeria and
Morocco) where Canada accounts for a relevant share of the market, while US exports are neg-
ligible. Inmarkets, where the USA and Canada compete for market share, private firms are some-
times vertically integrated (like Cargill in the EU and in Indonesia), while in other cases they sell
to an importing STE (e.g. Cargill in Japan) (Kneen, 2002). Finally, in a number of importing
countries, the USmultinational firms account for amajor share of themarket and do not compete
with the Canadian Wheat Board (e.g. Egypt and the Republic of Korea).
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exogenous and ignore economies of scale. These models, in fact, assume that
market structure cannot change and that firms are identical with respect to their
degree of forward integration and that the market structure is always the
duopoly regime f2, 2g. If in Figure 2 one assumes exogenously regime
f2, 2g as market structure, then eliminating subsidy s would not make
the STE payoff negative; on the contrary, when transaction costs are high,
the private firm is vertically integrated and eliminating s makes market struc-
ture shift to a monopoly of the multinational firm. Likewise, eliminating U
may have no trade effect if the private firm is assumed to export only
indirectly, whereas in our model it may induce a shift to a monopoly of the
multinational firm if the latter is vertically integrated. As shown in the follow-
ing section, the trade and welfare effects of STE subsidy elimination may be
very different when market structure changes.
4. Trade and welfare effects of eliminating STE
subsidies: numerical examples
The trade and welfare effects of the changes in market structure discussed in
the previous section are illustrated here by means of numerical examples.17
Table 2 presents the changes in total exports, prices and market shares in
country z when transaction and fixed costs change and the STE subsidies
are zero, under the various possible market structures illustrated in Figure 1.
Table 3 provides the corresponding changes in welfare. For country i,
welfare is obtained by aggregating the profits of the firm and domestic produ-
cer and consumer surpluses, while for country j, welfare is the sum of the
payoff to the STE and consumer surplus, minus government expenditure. In
country z, welfare is given by consumer surplus only. The percentage
changes in the tables are calculated with respect to the benchmark
tz ¼ G ¼ U ¼ s ¼ 0.
Table 2 shows that in regime f2, 2g the STE’s market share is always higher
than that of the private firm. In this regime, STE exports are well above the
level of a profit-maximising firm exerting monopsony power with respect to
domestic producers. In addition, within area f2, 2g, an increase in transaction
costs further increases the STE’s share at the expense of the private firm;
welfare in country i diminishes more than in country j, essentially because
of the steep decline in the private firm’s profits. Overall welfare declines.
Things change if market structure changes. The trade effects when a shift
towards regime f3, 2g occurs are rather different: the private firm gains sub-
stantial market share, as it skips transaction costs and increases exports at
the expense of the STE; the increase in the private firm’s exports may be
17 In the numerical examples, the values of demand and supply parameters are the following:
a ¼ 30, b ¼ 1, l ¼ 60, d ¼ 1, w ¼ 5, r ¼ 0.5, u ¼ 5, k ¼ 0.5. As for the other variables, we set
Cm ¼ Cs ¼ 180. Parameters have been chosen to ensure that equilibrium quantities and prices
are positive. Quantities and prices in countries i and j are not reported due to space limitations.
For the same reason, the various welfare components are not reported in the tables. All this infor-
mation is available from the author.
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Table 2. Exports, prices and market shares as a function of transaction and fixed costs
(s ¼ U ¼ 0)
G tz
0 3 5 10 15 20
500 XMz 100 89 77 66 55 0
XSz 100 90 81 71 62 65
Xz 100 90 79 69 59 38
Pz 100 108 117 126 134 152
STE market share 58.3 58.8 59.3 60.1 61.1 100
M market share 41.7 41.2 40.7 39.9 38.9 0
400 XMz 100 89 77 66 55 0
XSz 100 90 81 71 62 65
Xz 100 90 79 69 59 38
Pz 100 108 117 126 134 152
STE market share 58.3 58.8 59.3 60.1 61.1 100
M market share 41.7 41.2 40.7 39.9 38.9 0
300 XMz 100 89 77 66 55 0
XSz 100 90 81 71 62 65
Xz 100 90 79 69 59 38
Pz 100 108 117 126 134 152
STE market share 58.3 58.8 59.3 60.1 61.1 100
M market share 41.7 41.2 40.7 39.9 38.9 0
200 XMz 100 89 77 66 152 152
XSz 100 90 81 71 0 0
Xz 100 90 79 69 64 64
Pz 100 108 117 126 130 130
STE market share 58.3 58.8 59.3 60.1 0 0
M market share 41.7 41.2 40.7 39.9 100 100
100 XMz 100 89 77 124 152 152
XSz 100 90 81 54 0 0
Xz 100 90 79 83 64 64
Pz 100 108 117 114 130 130
STE market share 58.3 58.8 59.3 37.7 0 0
M market share 41.7 41.2 40.7 62.3 100 100
0 XMz 100 108 116 124 152 152
XSz 100 85 69 54 0 0
Xz 100 94 89 83 64 64
Pz 100 104 109 114 130 130
STE market share 58.3 52.3 45.5 37.7 0 0
M market share 41.7 47.7 54.5 62.3 100 100
Note: Typeface: regular, regime f2,2g; bold, regime f3,2g; italic, regime f0,2g; bold italic, regime f3,0g.
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sufficiently high to ensure an increase in total exports. This happens in the
example when G ¼ 100 and tz increases from 5 to 10. Price in market z
falls and welfare of countries i and z improves, while that of country j drasti-
cally worsens. Producer welfare increases in country i and declines in the
STE’s home country. Overall welfare may improve; this means that an
increase in transaction costs inducing the private firm to change its export
strategy may be less harmful for world welfare than one that does not
change market structure. The costs of this change in market structure are
borne by producers in country j, whose welfare declines significantly.
A sharper increase in transaction costs implies a shift from a duopoly to a
monopoly of the private firm, i.e. regime f3, 0g. The numerical example con-
firms expectations: as a consequence of this shift in regime, a sharp decrease in
overall exports to z and a price rise imply a worsening of total welfare. Only
Table 3. Welfare as a function of transaction and fixed costs (s ¼ U ¼ 0)
G tz
0 3 5 10 15 20
500 Wi 100 76 54 36 21 0
Wj 100 80 63 47 34 38
Wz 100 80 63 48 35 14
Total welfare 100 79 61 45 31 19
400 Wi 100 76 54 36 21 0
Wj 100 80 63 47 34 38
Wz 100 80 63 48 35 14
Total welfare 100 79 61 45 31 19
300 Wi 100 76 54 36 21 0
Wj 100 80 63 47 34 38
Wz 100 80 63 48 35 14
Total welfare 100 79 61 45 31 19
200 Wi 100 76 54 36 135 135
Wj 100 80 63 47 0 0
Wz 100 80 63 48 40 40
Total welfare 100 79 61 45 47 47
100 Wi 100 76 54 104 193 193
Wj 100 80 63 25 0 0
Wz 100 80 63 69 40 40
Total welfare 100 79 61 62 59 59
0 Wi 100 119 140 162 250 250
Wj 100 70 45 25 0 0
Wz 100 89 79 69 40 40
Total welfare 100 89 80 74 71 71
Note: Typeface: regular, regime f2,2g; bold, regime f3,2g; italic, regime f0,2g; bold italic, regime f3,0g.
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the private firm and producers in country i benefit from this change in market
structure.
When transaction and fixed costs are high enough for regime f0, 2g to be a
Nash equilibrium, the trade and welfare effects are also straightforward. With
an STE monopoly, exports are lower and price in market z higher than under
the duopoly f2, 2g; the winners are producers in country j whereas the other
two countries are worse off. An interesting insight from Table 3 is that the
overall welfare in regime f0, 2g, everything else being equal, is lower than
in the case of a monopoly of a vertically integrated firm, regime f3, 0g. This
is because exports are higher18 and, thus, country z, is better off. The gains
for producers in country i, for the private firm and for consumers in country
z, are thus larger than the losses of producers in country j.
The trade and welfare effects of the regime shifts due to a change in subsidy
s, illustrated in Figure 2, are reported in Tables 4 and 5. Figure 2 shows that
eliminating s does not change the market structure when initially regime
f2, 2g is a Nash equilibrium, and when tz is below the critical value. As
expected, eliminating s implies an increase in the private firm’s market
share at the expenses of the STE. As a consequence, however, total exports
decline and price in market z increases because, under regime f2, 2g,
exports by the profit-maximising firm exerting monopsony power are lower
than those of the STE maximising producers’ welfare.19 In this case, the
only winner is country i, which benefits from the higher profits of the
private firm and higher producer surplus, whereas both countries j and z are
worse off. In country j, the sharp decline in producer surplus is not compen-
sated for by the decrease in government expenditure, if s is initially low
enough (in our example, s  8). The elimination of subsidies to the STE
without any change in market structure makes overall welfare decline.
When the initial values of s and tz are such that the private firm’s profits are
negative and regime f0, 2g is a Nash equilibrium, the effects of subsidy elimi-
nation depend on the initial value of tz. As already mentioned, when tz is below
the critical value (tz, 11), then the regime shifts to a duopoly, but this may or
may not imply an increase in trade. In our example, if the initial subsidy is high
enough (s ¼ 25), then the shift towards duopoly f2, 2g does not increase
overall exports. This is because the decline in STE exports is not compensated
for by the entry of the private firm. As a consequence, country z does not
benefit from the duopoly and is made worse off. Country j, although reducing
its exports, is better off, as the losses in the producers’ and consumers’ surplus
are smaller than the reduction in public expenditure. Clearly, country i
improves its welfare. The shift from an STE monopoly to a duopoly
implies, as expected, an increase in overall welfare.
18 From Table A1 of the Appendix, it is easy to show that under cost symmetry and when s ¼ 0,
XSz
02 , XMz
30.
19 If the STE maximises profit, an increase in the private firm’s market share at the expense of the
STE, due to a reduction of s, would reduce total exports and increase the price in market z less.
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Table 4. Exports, prices and market shares as a function of transaction costs and the
subsidy s (U ¼ 0; G ¼ 200)
s tz
0 3 5 10 15 20
0 XMz 100 89 77 66 152 152
XSz 100 90 81 71 0 0
Xz 100 90 79 69 64 64
Pz 100 108 117 126 130 130
STE market share 58.3 58.8 59.3 60.1 0 0
M market share 41.7 41.2 40.7 39.9 100 100
2 XMz 97 86 75 64 130 152
XSz 105 95 86 76 43 0
Xz 102 91 81 71 79 64
Pz 98 107 115 124 117 130
STE market share 60.1 60.7 61.5 62.6 31.9 0
M market share 39.9 39.3 38.5 37.4 68.1 100
4 XMz 95 84 72 61 127 135
XSz 110 100 91 81 48 33
Xz 104 93 83 73 81 76
Pz 96 105 114 123 115 120
STE market share 61.8 62.6 63.7 65.0 34.7 25.4
M market share 38.2 37.4 36.3 35.0 65.3 74.6
6 XMz 92 81 70 58 0 133
XSz 115 105 96 86 90 38
Xz 105 95 85 74 53 77
Pz 95 104 112 121 139 119
STE market share 63.5 64.5 65.7 67.3 100 28.5
M market share 36.5 35.5 34.3 32.7 0 71.5
8 XMz 90 78 67 56 0 130
XSz 120 110 100 91 97 43
Xz 107 97 87 76 57 79
Pz 93 102 111 119 137 117
STE market share 65.1 66.3 67.7 69.5 100 31.5
M market share 34.9 33.7 32.3 30.5 0 68.5
25 XMz 68 56 0 0 0 0
XSz 162 152 156 143 130 117
Xz 122 112 91 83 76 68
Pz 81 89 107 114 120 126
STE market share 76.9 79.0 100 100 100 100
M market share 23.1 21.0 0 0 0 0
Note: Typeface: regular, regime f2,2g; bold, regime f3,2g; italic, regime f0,2g; bold italic, regime f3,0g.
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Finally, when transaction costs are above the critical level, eliminating s
results in a private-firm monopoly (regime f3, 0g). The impact of this policy
shock depends on the initial regime, i.e. the size of the subsidy s. If initially
there is a duopoly (regime f3, 2g), then the regime shift implies a reduction
in total exports and an increase in price in z. Country i is obviously better
off, while both countries j and z are worse off. Nevertheless, overall this
policy change may be welfare-improving, as the gains of country i’s producers
and the private firm may be large enough to offset the losses in all the other
countries. These findings are different from those predicted when a fixed
market structure is assumed and the possibility of vertical integration is
ignored. In this model, after subsidy elimination, the STE is no longer com-
petitive vis a` vis the vertically integrated private firm. This would not
Table 5. Welfare as a function of transaction costs and the subsidy s (U ¼ 0; G ¼ 200)
s tz
0 3 5 10 15 20
0 Wi 100 76 54 36 135 135
Wj 100 80 63 47 0 0
Wz 100 80 63 48 40 40
Total welfare 100 79 61 45 47 47
2 Wi 94 71 50 32 63 135
Wj 103 8 66 50 13 0
Wz 104 84 66 50 63 40
Total welfare 101 56 62 46 46 47
4 Wi 89 66 46 29 55 79
Wj 105 85 67 52 14 5
Wz 107 87 69 53 66 57
Total welfare 103 82 64 47 46 44
6 Wi 83 61 42 25 0 71
Wj 106 86 69 53 60 6
Wz 111 90 72 55 28 60
Total welfare 104 83 64 48 33 44
8 Wi 78 56 38 22 0 63
Wj 107 87 69 53 59 5
Wz 115 94 75 58 30 63
Total welfare 104 84 65 49 33 44
25 Wi 39 23 0 0 0 0
Wj 79 58 66 40 18 0
Wz 15 126 82 69 57 46
Total welfare 41 81 60 45 32 21
Note: Typeface: regular, regime f2,2g; bold, regime f3,2g; italic, regime f0,2g; bold italic, regime f3,0g.
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happen if the private firm as well was assumed to operate as a ‘pure middle-
man’. Thus, in this model, there is a huge increase in exports and welfare of
country i and a more pronounced decline in the welfare of country j, as well
as in that of its producers.
If, however, s is initially large enough for a monopoly of the STE to prevail,
then subsidy elimination and the consequent shift to a private-firm monopoly
may or may not result in an increase in total exports, depending on the initial
value of the subsidy. In the example, if s ¼ 6, then total exports increase
Table 6. Exports, prices and market shares as a function of transaction costs and the
subsidy U (s ¼ 0; G ¼ 200)
U tz
0 3 5 10 15 20
0 XMz 100 89 77 66 152 152
XSz 100 90 81 71 0 0
Xz 100 90 79 69 64 64
Pz 100 108 117 126 130 130
STE market share 58.3 58.8 59.3 60.1 0 0
M market share 41.7 41.2 40.7 39.9 100 100
20 XMz 100 89 77 66 152 152
XSz 100 90 81 71 0 0
Xz 100 90 79 69 64 64
Pz 100 108 117 126 130 130
STE market share 58.3 58.8 59.3 60.1 0 0
M market share 41.7 41.2 40.7 39.9 100.0 100
50 XMz 100 89 77 66 152 140
XSz 100 90 81 71 0 23
Xz 100 90 79 69 64 72
Pz 100 108 117 126 130 123
STE market share 58.3 58.8 59.3 60.1 0 18.7
M market share 41.7 41.2 40.7 39.9 100.0 81.3
100 XMz 100 89 77 66 132 140
XSz 100 90 81 71 38 23
Xz 100 90 79 69 100 72
Pz 100 108 117 126 118 123
STE market share 58.3 58.8 59.3 60.1 22.4 18.7
M market share 41.7 41.2 40.7 39.9 55.2 81.3
200 XMz 100 89 77 66 132 140
XSz 100 90 81 71 38 23
Xz 100 90 79 69 100 72
Pz 100 108 117 126 118 123
STE market share 58.3 58.8 59.3 60.1 22.4 18.7
M market share 41.7 41.2 40.7 39.9 55.2 81.3
Note: Typeface: regular, regime f2,2g; bold, regime f3,2g; italic, regime f0,2g; bold italic, regime f3,0g.
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because, when transaction costs are high, equilibrium exports of the vertically
integrated firm are higher than those of the STE maximising producer welfare;
however, if s is very high (in Table 5, s ¼ 25) then STE exports may be higher
than those of the vertically integrated firm. In both cases, the gains of country i
are very high, and the losses of country j are relevant, despite the large benefits
due to eliminating the government expenditure. Overall, this regime shift is
welfare-improving.
Tables 6 and 7 report the results of eliminating the subsidy U, under the
assumption that s ¼ 0 and for the market structure changes illustrated in
Figure 3. As already mentioned in the previous section, when tz is below
the critical level, eliminating U has no effect on market structure; furthermore,
there are not even any trade and welfare effects. This is because eliminating U
does not influence exports of either firm. Rather, it affects only the distribution
of welfare within country j: while total welfare of country j does not change,
eliminating U shifts the government expenditure previously devoted to the
subsidy, from producers back to the taxpayer. The payoff to the STE declines,
but as long as it remains positive, this does not produce any other effect.
Table 7. Welfare as a function of transaction costs and the subsidy U (s ¼ 0; G ¼ 200)
U tz
0 3 5 10 15 20
0 Wi 100 76 54 36 135 135
Wj 100 80 63 47 0 0
Wz 100 80 63 48 40 40
Total welfare 100 79 61 45 47 47
20 Wi 100 76 54 36 135 135
Wj 100 80 63 47 0 0
Wz 100 80 63 48 40 40
Total welfare 100 79 61 45 47 47
50 Wi 100 76 54 36 135 95
Wj 100 80 63 47 0 2
Wz 100 80 63 48 40 52
Total welfare 100 79 61 45 47 44
100 Wi 100 76 54 36 70 95
Wj 100 80 63 47 11 2
Wz 100 80 63 48 60 52
Total welfare 100 79 61 45 46 44
200 Wi 100 76 54 36 70 95
Wj 100 80 63 47 11 2
Wz 100 80 63 48 60 52
Total welfare 100 79 61 45 46 44
Note: Typeface: regular, regime f2,2g; bold, regime f3,2g; italic, regime f0,2g; bold italic, regime f3,0g.
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Relevant trade and welfare effects occur if transaction costs are above the
critical value and if, after eliminating U, the payoff to the STE becomes nega-
tive. The regime shift from a duopoly (regime f3, 2g) to a monopoly of the
private firm (regime f3, 0g) implies a decrease in exports and a rise in the
price in market z. Country z is worse off and even welfare in country j declines.
In this example, the increase in country i’s welfare may be so large that even
overall welfare improves.
5. Conclusions
In order to assess the effects on market structure, trade and welfare of elimi-
nating subsidies to STEs in agricultural markets, as tentatively agreed at the
WTO Hong Kong Ministerial in December 2005, a theoretical duopoly
model has been developed, where a private trader competes with an STE on
a foreign market. Besides the differences in the objective functions, broadly
stressed by the literature on agricultural STEs, the model introduces a
further distinction between the private trader and the STE, namely their differ-
ent potential for forward integration. Building on the theory of multinational
enterprises and on game theoretical models including multinational firms,
the model assumes that the private firm may choose vertical integration in
order to eliminate the costly arm’s-length transactions; this option is chosen
by the private firm when transaction costs are high enough with respect to
the fixed costs associated with vertical integration. A further key feature of
the model developed in this paper is that market structure is the outcome
of the first stage of the game, and hence endogenous.
The paper’s most relevant finding is that eliminating STE subsidies may
have different impacts on market structure, trade and welfare depending on
the initial market structure and the private trader’s degree of vertical inte-
gration. The paper identifies a variety of possible situations occurring on the
third market, under which the elimination of subsidies may produce rather
diverse results. Furthermore, it is also emphasised that the impact of eliminat-
ing STE subsidies that affect fixed costs is very different from that of eliminat-
ing subsidies affecting variable costs; while the latter influence the choices of
both firms, and thus always affect exports and welfare, the former influence
only the payoff to the STE and, consequently, its entry choice. This means
that eliminating fixed cost subsidies may affect market structure, trade and
countries’ welfare only if before the policy change the STE’s disadvantage
with respect to the private firm is so large that without subsidies the STE
cannot enter the market. In all other cases, eliminating fixed cost subsidies
does not produce any change in market structure, trade or countries’ welfare.
These findings may have interesting implications for the debate on the
expected effects of the WTO agreement on agriculture. The results suggest
that the impact of STE subsidy elimination should be assessed on a case-by-
case basis, as the effect on market structure, trade and welfare may be very
different depending on the conditions occurring on the specific third market.
The paper has shown, for example, that the impact is likely to be smaller if,
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for any reason, the private firm on that market is not vertically integrated. In
this case, the elimination of subsidies affecting variable costs reduces the STE
market share and increases that of the private firm; market structure does not
change, even though trade diminishes and overall welfare falls. At the same
time, eliminating subsidies affecting the STE’s fixed costs does not have
trade effects, and only transfers resources domestically from producers back
to taxpayers. Conversely, these policy changes may affect market structure
in markets where private firms are vertically integrated; in this case, it is poss-
ible that subsidy elimination will make the STE payoff negative, and this will
have drastic negative effects on the welfare of the country whose exports are
managed by the STE.
These implications overall reinforce the already well-established idea
that the STE issue should be addressed within the WTO framework on a
case-by-case basis, as the trade-distorting impact of STEs depends upon
their nature and their objectives (e.g. Dixit and Josling, 1997; OECD, 2001;
McCorriston and MacLaren, 2002). This paper adds a further perspective to
the discussion of this issue, by stressing that another factor influencing the
impact of any further disciplining of STEs that needs to be taken into
account is the degree of integration of their rivals and the existing market
structure. The more integrated private traders are, the greater their advantages
and the higher the probability that eliminating government-granted STE privi-
leges may lead to a negative payoff to the STE. In the model presented in this
paper, this causes the STE to exit from the export market, competition is
reduced and producers in the country whose exports are managed by the
STE become significantly worse off. In this perspective, concerns that elimi-
nating STE privileges may end up increasing the market power of large private
traders are justified (Fulton et al., 2001; Young, 2005). One possible policy
implication is that the removal of STE subsidies, which certainly alter compe-
tition with private traders, should be accompanied by domestic reforms remov-
ing existing restrictions to STE operations and re-establishing ‘fair’ competition
between the exporting firms. Because producers in countries where STEs are
active are penalised by the structural disadvantage of the STEs relative to
private firms, the possibility for STEs to purchase facilities, to invest abroad
in trading assets and to vertically integrate could be introduced. Such a
process, along with the privatisation of previously state-owned enterprises,
has already begun in some STEs, such as the former New Zealand Dairy
Board and the Australian Wheat Board (Lobb and Fraser, 2005).
On the contrary, when conditions on the third market are such that the
private firms are not vertically integrated, then privileges to exporting STEs
provide them with a competitive advantage with respect to private traders
and the removal of the subsidies may lead to increased competition, trade
and welfare. Again, positions taken in this respect by some WTO members
are, therefore, justified.
These implications emphasise the potential importance of taking market
structure issues into consideration in multilateral trade negotiations. The
level of competition in international markets to date is not an issue in the
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WTO, as no agreement was reached at the Cancun Ministerial, when this
possibility was debated, to include ‘trade and competition’ among the nego-
tiable issues in the DDA round. As a result, competition policy for WTO
remains a matter for national governments. However, trade policies issues
are closely linked to market structure and competition issues (MacLaren
and Josling, 1999). The need for explicit consideration of the issues of
market structure and competition when dealing with further STE disciplines
in WTO negotiations is an additional implication of the analysis developed
in this paper.
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Table A1. Exports and domestic sales under the different outcomes of the game
STE actions
0 1 2
Private
firm
actions
0 XS01j ¼
aþ s u
D
XS02j ¼
aþ s u rXS02z
D
XS02z ¼
Dðlþ s u tzÞ  F  rs
A
1 XM
10
i ¼
a w
2H
XM11i ¼
a w
2H
XM12i ¼
a w
2H
XS11j ¼
aþ s u
D
XS12j ¼
aþ s u rXS12z
D
XS12z ¼
Dðlþ s u tzÞ  F  rs
A
2 XM20i ¼
a w 2kXM20z
2H
XM21i ¼
a w 2kXM21z
2H
XM22i ¼
a w 2kXM22z
2H
XM20z ¼
Hðl w tzÞ  E
B
XM21z ¼
Hðl w tzÞ  E
B
XM22z ¼
A½Hðlw tzÞEdH½Dðlu tz þ sÞ Frs
Q
XS21j ¼
aþ s u
D
XS22j ¼
aþ s u rXS22z
D
XS22z ¼
B½Dðl u tz þ sÞ F rs dD½Hðlw tzÞE
Q
3 XM30i ¼
a w 2kXM30z
2H
XM31i ¼
a w 2kXM31z
2H
XM32i ¼
a w 2kXM32z
2H
XM30z ¼
Hðl wÞ  E
B
XM31z ¼
Hðl wÞ  E
B
XM32z ¼
A½Hðl wÞ  E  dH½Dðl u tz þ sÞ  F  rs
Q
XS31j ¼
aþ s u
D
XS32j ¼
aþ s u rXS32z
D
XS32z ¼
B½Dðl u tz þ sÞ  F  rs  dD½Hðl wÞ  E
Q
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Table A2. Payoff to the firms under the different outcomes of the game
STE actions
0 1 2
Private
firm
actions
0 0 0 0
0 S01 ¼ ðaþ s uÞ
2
2D
þUCs S02 ¼ ðaþ s uÞ
2
2D
þ ðV 0 þ s rs
D
 tzÞXS02z 
T 0 ðXS02z Þ2
2
þ U Cs
1 M
10 ¼ P Cm M11 ¼ P Cm M12 ¼ P Cm
0 S11 ¼ ðaþ s uÞ
2
2D
þUCs S12 ¼ ðaþ s uÞ
2
2D
þ ðV 0 þ s ðrs=DÞ  tzÞ
XS12z 
T0 ðXS12z Þ2
2
þ U Cs
2 M
20 ¼ Pþ ðV  tzÞXM20z
 TðXM20z Þ2  Cm
M21 ¼ Pþ ðV  tzÞXM21z
 TðXM21z Þ2  Cm
M22 ¼ Pþ ðV  tz  dXS22z ÞXM22z  TðXM22z Þ2  Cm
0 S21 ¼ ðaþ s uÞ
2
2D
þUCs S22 ¼ ðaþ s uÞ
2
2D
þ ðV 0 þ s rs
D
 tz  dXM22z Þ
XS22z 
T 0 ðXS22z Þ2
2
þ U Cs
3 M
30 ¼ Pþ VXM30z 
TðXM30z Þ2  G  Cm
M31 ¼ PþVXM31z
TðXM31z Þ2 GCm
M32 ¼ Pþ ðV  dXS32z ÞXM32z  TðXM32z Þ2  G  Cm
0 S31 ¼ aþ s uÞ
2
2D
þUCs S32 ¼ ðaþ s uÞ
2
2D
þ ðV 0 þ s rs
D
 tz  dXM32z Þ
XS32z 
T0 ðXS32z Þ2
2
þ U Cs
Note: P ¼ ða wÞ
2
4H
; V ¼ l w E
H
; T ¼ dþ k k
2
H
;V 0 ¼ l u F
D
; T 0 ¼ 2dþ r r
2
D
:
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